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EVER THE TWAIN SHALL MEET
Fred S. McChesney*
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
REFORM. By Susan Rose-Ackerman. New York: Cambridge

University Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 266. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $18.95.

This I tell ya, brother, you can't have one without the other . . . .
Try, try, try to separate them, it's an illusion.
Try, try, try and you will only come to this conclusion.
- Frank Sinatra1

Instinctively, corruption is deplorable. Nobody likes private citi
zens paying governmental officials for special favors. Few have de
plored corruption longer or in greater detail than economist Susan
Rose-Ackerman.2
In Corruption and Government, Professor Rose-Ackerman dis
cusses how corruption starts ("causes"), why it is bad ("conse
quences"), and how to stop it ("reform"), principally from an eco
nomic perspective.3 Professor Rose-Ackerman's interest in corruption
derives partly from her outside work with international agencies, es
pecially time spent at the World Bank - "a transformative experi
ence" (p. xi). Her twenty-two page bibliography ranges across sources
in economics and politics, plus many documents from the World Bank
and other international groups.
Causes, consequences, and reform constitute a sensible approach
to analyzing corruption. One must first know the reasons for and ef
fects of corruption before advancing any convincing prescription for
correcting it. The book does not divide itself quite so neatly along
those three lines. Causes, consequences, and reforms are intermingled
in many chapters, as the book cycles through all three. Ultimately,

*
Class of 196 7 James B. Haddad Professor, Northwestern University School of Law;
Professor, Department of Management & Strategy, Kellogg School of Management. A.B.
1970, Holy Cross College; J.D. 1978, University of Miami; Ph.D. 1982 (Economics), Univer
sity of Virginia. - Ed. Tamara Shields provided helpful research assistance.

1. Sammy Cahn & Jimmy Van Heusen, Love and Marriage (ASCAP) (popularized by
Frank Sinatra in 1955), at http://www.spiritofsinatra.com (last visited May 1, 2001).
2. Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale University.

3. "Economics is a powerful tool for the analysis of corruption. Cultural differences and
morality provide nuance and subtlety, but an economic approach is fundamental to under
standing where corrupt incentives are the greatest and have the biggest impact." P. xi.
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however, the reader understands well what Professor Rose-Ackerman
sees as corruption's causes, costs, and cures.
In Part I, I use Professor Rose-Ackerman's tripartite division to
summarize briefly her analysis of corruption. As I hope to show, there
is much of interest and value in her analysis. Part II, however, explains
that what she means by the single term "corruption" actually encom
passes different phenomena with varying economic and legal implica
tions. Some corruption is economically bad and illegal. Some is
economically bad, but legal. And some is actually economically desir
able, albeit illegal. Corruption turns out to be a more subtle phenome
non than Corruption and Government portrays it.
To foreshadow these points, consider four examples. Jewish free
dom fighters in 1943 pay German soldiers to smuggle arms into the
Warsaw Ghetto and smuggle Jews out.4 At a time and place where
abortion is illegal, doctors selling abortions pay government officials
not to stop them. A politician takes campaign contributions from a
constituent seeking a lucrative government contract and orders her
staff to help the constituent get the contract. Politicians allow illegal
transvestite reviews to take place in exchange for the organizers' pay
ing for causes that the politicians choose.5
All of these examples entail corruption, as Professor Rose
Ackerman (and most others, probably) would define it.6 But as in
stinctive reactions to these examples indicate - and, I will argue, as a
more formal matter of economics - some corruption is actually good.
In proposing truly useful reforms, one must distinguish good from bad
corruption.
The examples also illustrate a point developed in Part III of this
Review. When all is said, corruption is fundamentally a function of the

4. See, e.g., DAN KURZ MAN, TH E BRAVEST BATTLE: TH E Tw ENTY-EIGHT DAYS OF
TH E WARSAW GHETTO UPRI SING (1976); JOH N HERSEY, TH E WALL (1950); Gary s.
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforc
ers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1974) (discussing bribes paid to Nazis by Jews).
5. The following describes the transvestite "Miss All-America Camp Beauty Pageant"
and similar drag beauty contests of the 1960 s.
The organizer was Jack Doroshow, also known as Sabrina, who held 46 contests a year
from 1959 to 196 7 through his company, the Nationals Academy, which in its heyday had 100
employees on the payroll.
Mainstream America didn't know it, but the nation had a flourishing drag subculture, and
not just in the major cities . . . .

Since local laws often prohibited cross-dressing, Mr. Doroshow would meet with officials
and propose a donation to some unspecified charity. In return, the town would pass a vari
ance allowing the contest to take place.

William Grimes, The Queen' on the Runway Again, N. Y.

TIMES, March 27, 1993, at 13.

6 . Professor Rose-Ackerman does not use these specific examples, but they fall under
what I understand to be her definition of corruption.
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size and power of government.7 This creates ambivalence and tension
for international agencies that adopt a policy of limiting corruption.
The agencies' principal function - providing financial support to na
tional governments - increases the size and power of those govern
ments, and thus facilitates corruption. These last points are largely ig
nored in Professor Rose-Ackerman's book.
I do not claim that governments and international agencies never
do good things, or that reducing truly harmful corruption is undesir
able. My claim is only that not all corruption is harmful economically,
and even if it were, international agencies' role in corruption cannot
be brushed over.
I.

CAUSES, COSTS, AND CORRECTION OF CORRUPTION

The length of Professor Rose-Ackerman's bibliography attests to
the fascination that corruption holds for many.8 Nonetheless, by rush
ing into this trove of material the book never fully defines what cor
ruption is. It is said to be a type of "rent seeking," in which private
producers and politicians "gain an advantage in dividing up the bene
fits of economic activity" (p. 2; citations omitted). Corruption "de
scribes a relationship between the state and the private sector. . . . The
relative bargaining power of these groups determines both the overall
impact of corruption on society and the distribution of the gains be
tween bribers and bribees" (p. 113).
However, she says, not all payments to government officials are
bribes; some are merely gifts. "The definition of bribes and gifts is a
cultural matter" (p. 1 10) . "[C]orruption has different meanings in dif
ferent societies" (p. 5). And because " 'culture' is dynamic and con
stantly changing" (p. 1 10), what constitutes corruption must be, too.
In her concluding chapter (pp. 225-29), Professor Rose-Ackerman
seems to have settled on dictatorial kleptomania plus outright bribery
7. "Size and power" refer, respectively, to the number of economic domains over which
government has authority and the amount of authority it has within those domains.
"Authority," in turn, refers to .the de facto ability of government to control economic activ.

�

8. Pp. 230-52. Other economic analyses of corruption could be added to the bibliogra
phy. E.g. , James Alm, The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy, 24 EGON. INQUIRY
243 (1985); Bruce L. Benson, Corruption in Law Enforcement: One Consequence of the
"Tragedy of the Commons " Arising with Public Allocation Processes, 8 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 73 (1988); Bruce L. Benson & John Baden, The Political Economy of Governmental
Corruption: The Logic of Underground Government, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1985); Steven
N. S. Cheung, A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption, 14 CONTEMP. ECON.
PoL'Y, July 1996 , at 1; Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Ramseyer, Cheap Bribes and the Corrup
tion Ban: A Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators, 78 PUB. CHOICE 305 (1994).
Articles appearing after the Rose-Ackerman book are Daron Acemoglu & Thierry Verdier,
The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 194 (2000); A.
Mitchell Polinsky
ECON. 1 (2001).

&

Steven Shave!!, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J. PUB.
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of lower government officials as the definition of corruption.9 Part of
the definitional haziness stems from the book's almost exclusive focus
on corruption in developing countries. For example, the book details
the remarkable extent of and sheer brazenness with which autocrats
("kleptocrats") in some countries plunder their treasuries and their
citizenry (pp. 1 16-17). Given Professor Rose-Ackerman's background
and interest in the underdeveloped world, her concentration on modes
of corruption there is hardly surprising.
But autocratic theft and crude bribery are not the usual way that
private interests and government officials transact in more developed
societies. Most frequently, American politicians obtain money from
private citizens from campaign donations and the like, in exchange for
"access" to the politician. Is this corruption? Professor Rose
Ackerman's book does not say it is, although other developed-world
sources certainly believe it is.10 Similarly, do union endorsements and
financial support amount to corruption when given in exchange for a
politician's support for raising the minimum wage? Nothing in Cor
ruption and Government helps answer that question.11
9. "In a corrupt relationship both the briber and the recipient are better off, but the
transaction violates government policy." P. 225. The definition of corruption as kleptomania
plus bribery parallels Professor Rose-Ackerman's definition of corruption elsewhere: "Cor
ruption is the misuse of public office for private gain. The structure of the state creates
pockets of monopoly power where politicians and civil servants have discretionary power.
Officials can use the power to enrich themselves." Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and
Democracy, 90 ASIL PROC. 83, 83 (1996).
10. Common Cause recently opined that, in America,
corporations, unions, and wealthy givers know that big money can result in extraordinary ac
cess and influence for their interests. Today, in Washington, if you want to be heard, it's
much easier if you have a big soft money check that can help pave the way. . . . [T]he soft
money system taints everyone in it - the givers, the candidates, and the parties. . . .
[T]hanks to soft money, the public now sees parties largely for what they, sadly, have be
come: mail drops for special interest money.
Press Release, Common Cause, A Message from Scott Harshbarger (May
with author).

7,

2000) (on file

1 1 . To focus solely on the blatant corruption in less-developed countries is to miss much
of what corruption and government are really all about. Analytically, corruption is corrup
tion. Anywhere. Depradations of tinhoms like the Marcoses are lamentable, but Ferdinand's
squirreled-away millions and all of Imelda's shoes together add up to just a few days' honest
(or legal) take for major politicians in the wealthier, First-World countries. One can snicker
about petty border shakedowns by uniformed foreign customs officials, but how is the epi
sode of the "Miss All-America Camp Beauty Pageant" any different? See Grimes, supra
note 5. Corruption may be overt, as when a foreign kleptocrat demands money from private
investors in his country, lest he otherwise seize (nationalize) their firms' assets. It may be
more subtle, as when American politicians about to run for re-election squeeze money from
tobacco companies to mail out to their constituents.
Just weeks ahead of the fall elections, Illinois officials on Thursday· began mailing out the
first checks under a $280 million property tax rebate program. . . .
The checks, funded by windfall revenue the state received as part of a legal settlement with
the tobacco industry, will range from about $25 to as much as $300 for homeowners, de
pending on how much they pay in property taxes.
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Causes of Corruption

Professor Rose-Ackerman divides the causes of corruption into
economic, cultural, and political problems (respectively, Parts I - III
of the book). The distinction, however, is not particularly compelling;
as noted above, she believes corruption's explanation lies in econom
ics. Even the discussion of corruption as a political problem (Part III)
is more about economics than about politics.
Economically, Professor Rose-Ackerman argues, corruption arises
for the same reason payments are made in private markets. Govern
ment officials have something to sell for which private citizens are
willing to pay (pp. 3-4). Bureaucrats sell import and export licenses (p.
1 1), access to government-controlled credit (p. 10), installation of
telephones by state-controlled monopolies (p. 15), and relief from
taxes and customs duties (pp. 19-21).
Indeed, from the book's recital of transactions, everything that
government has or does may lead to corruption. It is all a matter of
government property rights.12 Politicians and bureaucrats have some
thing of salable value to private citizens.13 Markets happen, be they
black markets or (legal) widget markets. So why do or should we care
more about payments to politicians than those to widget makers?
B.

Consequences of Corruption

Corruption is bad, for many reasons. It is "associated with lower
levels of investment and growth" (p. 2). It causes politicians and bu
reaucrats to favor "excessive public infrastructure investment."14 Of
ten, "corruption breeds more corruption and discourages legitimate
business investment" (p. 3).
Corruption not only is bad, it is always bad. On that, Professor
Rose-Ackerman is uncompromising: there is no good corruption. I
discuss this point in Part II, where I present more of the reasons Pro
fessor Rose-Ackerman gives for the unalloyed malignancy of corrup
tion.

Ray Long,

U. S. Will Tax Your State Tax Rebate,

CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2000, § 1, at 1 .

1 2 . "We define government corruption a s the sale by government officials o f govern
ment property for personal gain." Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J.
ECON. 599, 599 (1993).
13. "Corruption is a consequence of discretionary political authority. All governments
vest in officials discretionary control over some property. . . . " Benson & Baden, supra note
8, at 394.
14. P. 3. As discussed below, "excessive infrastructure" is a deceptively simple expres
sion, one implicating important problems about international agency activities. See infra Part
III, text accompanying notes 46-51 .
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Correction of Corruption

Professor Rose-Ackerman proposes a variety of reforms for the
corruption she details. That they are predictable reforms does not di
minish their potential value. We should eliminate programs in which
corruption is entrenched (pp. 39-42). Outright elimination, however, is
a last resort. "Many regulatory and spending programs have strong
justifications and ought to be reformed, and not eliminated" (p. 44).
Tax and customs collections could be simplified; regulation and social
benefit programs could be reformed to eliminate potential for corrup
tion (pp. 44-48). Reform of government procurement laws, obviously
rife with potential for corruption, is discussed at length (pp. 59-68).
Front and center is reform of the civil service in underdeveloped
nations, a subject occupying all of the book's Chapter Five. "Countries
emerging from a period one-party or authoritarian rule face the chal
lenge of creating a professional civil service" (p. 69), "professional"
meaning resistant to bribery. But how to reform entrenched bureauc
racies? Most frequently, Professor Rose-Ackerman advocates in
creased pay: "If public sector pay is very low, corruption is a survival
strategy" (p. 72).
Despite the book's frequent calls for better bureaucratic pay, how
ever, Professor Rose-Ackerman seems uncertain how much this will
really help. After advocating leveling off the difference between pub
lic- and private-sector salaries, she notes: "One should be careful,
however, not to exaggerate the public-private disparity. In most cases
total remuneration [for bureaucrats] includes not just formal wages
but also perks such as housing or health care" (p. 72). She then adds
that achieving whatever salary leveling is appropriate may be difficult
by itself.
The strain of reform can be reduced by complementary policies to
create jobs in the private sector and to encourage businesses to come out
from underground. A good start might focus on the creation of an honest
tax collection system. . . . One might then follow by cutting the civil
service as private sector growth permits. Unfortunately, growth itself will
cause its own problem - because existing corrupt officials will seek a
share of the new wealth by imposing new restrictions on private firms.
This problem may require unorthodox solutions. . . . [p. 74]

Cleaning corruption's stables clearly will be a Herculean task.
Professor Rose-Ackerman recognizes that reform will not be easy:
"One of the most vexing issues for reformers is determining when in
cumbent politicians and bureaucrats have an incentive to change" (p.
226). But she seems confident that a "hard look at regulatory laws to
see which can be eliminated, which can be simplified. . . and which re
quire improved enforcement" can succeed (p. 227).
One plausible alternative to corrupt government is privatization of
government enterprises and functions. If corruption depends on gov-

1354

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1348

ernment officials having de facto property rights over goods and serv
ices, stripping them of those rights by shifting resources to the private
sector would seem advisable. Privatization would take money away
from the kleptocrats and would reduce the favors bureaucrats have to
sell.
But Professor Rose-Ackerman is only lukewarm at best about pri
vatizing, and more often negative. If privatization occurs in a klep
tocracy, she objects, the kleptocrat may simply privatize by selling the
industry to himself or his family (p. 1 18). He may not be able to com
mit credibly not to tax the private enterprise inordinately, making the
firm worthless if privatized. "Furthermore, even if he can somehow
write binding contracts with investors, they may worry that a corrupt
ruler risks overthrow" (p. 1 18).
In fact, Professor Rose-Ackerman continues, privatization would
add to corruption, not correct it. Privatizing presents numerous oppor
tunities for bureaucratic corruption, including insider trading by public
officials and payments by newly privatized firms for special treatment
(e.g., tax breaks) (pp. 35-38). Professor Rose-Ackerman's bottom line:
"Corruption reduces the revenue-raising benefits of privatization and
the award of concessions. Firms that retain monopoly power through
bribery and favoritism undermine the efficiency benefits of turning
over state firms to private owners" (p. 38). So, in the end, Professor
Rose-Ackerman's corruption-correction program relies on improving
government, rather than implementing changes that would diminish
the role of government in the economy.
II.

THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION

Corruption and Government commendably stimulates readers to
consider corruption from an economic perspective. Given the impreci
sion with which corruption is sometimes defined, it is useful to start
with the fundamentals. Economically, two sorts of corruption may be
distinguished - purely political corruption and public-private corrup
tion, the latter referring to two different things.

A.

Purely Political Corruption

Some corruption is simply theft from the public till by politicians
or bureaucrats. Normatively, there is no case for government theft.15
Positively, it can be analyzed like any other theft. Its incidence is a
positive function of the benefits of crime (the expected amount that
can be stolen), and a negative function of the expected costs (deter-

15. Fred S. McChesney,
& EC ON. 225, 228 (1993).

Boxed In: Economists and Benefits of Crime,

13 l]'IT'L REV. L.
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mined by the probability of being caught and the penalties meted out)
to the criminal.16
Professor Rose-Ackerman, in discussing kleptocracy, refers to this
sort of corruption, which I will call "purely public corruption." She
rightly condemns purely public corruption (pp. 114-21), and no further
discussion is needed here. Dictatorship is bad, whether evaluated as a
social, political, or economic phenomenon.1 7
Professor Rose-Ackerman, however, omits one essential point in
her discussion
the size of the public fisc to which kleptocratic dicta
tors can help themselves. The economics of crime (including klepto
cratic theft) start with the benefits available. Anything that increases
the size of the dictator's, politician's, or bureaucrats' expected take
will increase the amount of kleptocratic and government taking, an is
sue considered below.
�

B.

Public-Private Corruption

Looting the treasury is a purely governmental. affair. The treasury
exists and government officials take part of it.18 A second form of cor
ruption, "public-private" corruption, entails payments to government
officials by private actors. The more government officials have to sell,
the more private parties will buy.
Unlike purely public corruption, public-private corruption is not
categorically bad. The notion of "good corruption" may be counter
intuitive, and Professor Rose-Ackerman rejects it completely. But a
better understanding of public-private corruption shows that some
corruption is indeed beneficial.
1.

Bad Public-Private Corruption: Rent Seeking

Economists call bad corruption rent seeking - special interests
seeking special favors ("rents"). 1 9 One routinely finds politicians dol
ing out favorable treatment to particular persons or industries.20 Pay16. The work on this subject is vast. The seminal work is Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). For a recent summary,
see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory ofPublic Enforcement of
Law, 38 l ECON. LIT. 45 (2000) .
17. Uzi Segal, Let's Agree That All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad, 108 J. POL. ECON.
569 (2000).
18. The treasury may exist because money had been taken previously from private par
ties, for example by taxation, but in this first sort of corruption the source of the money
makes no difference.
19. For a good introduction and extended bibliography by the lawyer-economist who
first analyzed rent seeking, see GORDON TULLOCK, RENT SEEKING (1993).
20. E.g. , Bruce Ingersoll, Sugar Producers Get $1.6 Billion of Federal Help, WALL ST. J.,
May 15, 2000, at B4:
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ments for special favors are certainly corruption as Professor Rose
Ackerman would define it.21
However, the favors-for-pay sequence often is perfectly legal. In
America, no law stops a politician from accepting - indeed, from so
liciting - money in exchange for constituents getting a chance to pre
sent their views to him. Nothing prevents private interests from con
tributing to have a chance to present their views. In fact, the process is
constitutionally protected,22 subject to regulations that do not prevent
politicians from raising sums unimaginable a generation ago.
This phenomenon presents a problem for analysts of corruption.
Unquestionably, rent seeking is economically undesirable: "Talented
people concentrate their effort on rent seeking rather than on produc
tive activities" (p. 213). On the other hand, it is indubitably legal, in
various forms in various countries. In underdeveloped countries,
Professor Rose-Ackerman says, the payments are often called "gifts,"
and we should respect local custom that views gifts to politicians an
acceptable part of the culture.23 In our developed country, we call
them PAC donations - pretending that these are really gifts, rather
than money for favors.
But if the gift exchanges are legal, and if, as Professor Rose
Ackerman says, we should respect local notions of what is legal, there
is little for an economist to complain or write about. To the extent that
corruption, albeit economically bad, is legal rent seeking, there is
nothing new in Corruption and Government. Professor Rose
Ackerman merely advocates Third World legal reform to require re
porting of gifts (p. 110), ignoring the utter impuissance of reporting
laws in the developed world to stop rent seeking.

U.S. sugar producers reap about $1.6 billion a year from a shaky federal price-support
program that the Clinton Administration just shored up with a big sugar-buying spree.
The government has long kept U.S. sugar prices far above the world market price by cur
tailing imports of lower-cost sugar and sticking consumers with the price-support tab in the
form of higher sugar, candy and soft-drink prices. . . .

. . . Since 1981, sugar refineries, food makers and consumers have been paying inflated prices
for raw cane sugar, refined sugar and sweetened food products. Two years ago, the total bill
amounted to $2.2 billion, up 29% from 1996, the GAO says.
Dairy farmers and tobacco growers, among others, have received special compensation
for low prices or crop losses. Sugar producers deserve the same "compassion," Jack Roney,
an American Sugar Alliance spokesman, says.

21. E.g., pp. 2, 147, 213; see supra text accompanying note 9.
22.

Buckley v.

23. E.g.,

pp.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

5, 110.
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May 2001]

2.

1357

Good Public-Private Corruption: Rent Extraction

Much of the corruption described in Professor Rose-Ackerman's
book involves payments known as "rent extraction" or "wealth extrac
tion."24 As with rent seeking, rent extraction is an economic term with
which Professor Rose-Ackerman is familiar. But the book ignores a
fundamental implication of the rent extraction model: in the real
world of public-private interactions, corruption can be good.25
Rent extraction is to rent seeking as tort is to contract. With rent
seeking, private and public parties have an extralegal contract that
makes both better off.26 The politician has the money and the con
stituent has the favor. With rent extraction, however, the public
private interchange is akin to tortious extortion or blackmail: the pri
vate party is paying not to be made worse off. For example, President
and Mrs. Clinton's threats in 1993 to impose price controls on the
health care industry - proposed but ultimately abandoned - gener
ated a flood of private money for politicians not to legislate. The New
York Times reported in late 1993:
As Congress prepares to debate drastic changes in the nation's health
care system, its members are receiving vast campaign contributions from
the medical industry, an amount apparently unprecedented for a non
election year. While it remains unclear who would benefit and who
would suffer under whatever health plan is ultimately adopted, it is ap
parent that the early winners are members of Congress.27

"Your money or your life" is the back-alley equivalent of political rent
extraction. Private parties surrender money to politicians rather than
lose something of even greater value.
The payments, however, can be benign. Price controls are extraor
dinarily costly to society economically (whatever their benefits to poli
ticians pushing them), and paying off legislators not to impose them is
economically beneficial overall. The payments to politicians to avoid
price controls must be less than the costs to payors, or the payments
would not be made.28 In general, payoffs (corruption) are good or bad
24. See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Creation and
Rent Extraction in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
25. For a more detailed discussion, see Fred S. McChesney, 'Pay to Pay ' Politics Exam
ined, with Lessons for Campaign-Finance Return, 6 INDEP. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
26. The contract is extralegal in that, although legal, it is not enforceable in court.
MCCHESNEY, supra note 24, at 86-109.

See

27. Neil A. Lewis, Medical Industry Showers Congress with Lobby Money, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1993, at Al.
28. The economics of rent extraction are more complicated. For example, if the private
payments are just transfers, they entail no economic costs. Also, the social-welfare costs
from the process are not the same as the amount payors would lose if the threatened legisla
tion were passed. But none of this is germane here.
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depending on whether the political action forestalled was bad or good.
If abortion is illegal, the abortionist's payments to politicians to have
abortions continue wm be evaluated as good by pro-choice advocates,
bad by pro-life partisans;
Finally, much rent .extracting,corruption is legal. Politicians' selling
relief from onerous taxes may be bad or good, depending whether the
tax is good or bad.29 But it is legal corruption, practiced routinely in
America by politicians on the House Ways and Means and Senate Fi
nance Committees.30 As one member of the House observed: "The
only reason it isn't considered bribery is that Congress gets to define
bribery."31 American culture today includes these legal gifts made
during congressional tax sessions.
C.

Corruption and Government Property Rights

Professor Rose-Ackerman doubtless appreciates the distinctions
between rent seeking and rent extraction. Chapter Four (economi
cally, the most analytic of the book) begins: "Corrupt incentives exist
because state officials have the power to allocate scarce benefits and
impose onerous costs" (p. 39). Any difference between rent seeking
and rent extraction seems unimportant to her, however, because either
will provoke corruption: "In practice, the distinction between active
[initiating] and passive corruption and between extortion and bribery
means little because both parties must agree before corruption can oc
cur" (p. 53).
This statement is true, but economically irrelevant. It means that
all corruption should be suppressed, regardless whether it is good or
bad. The very occurrence of paid-for agreements between private and
public figures constitutes corruption, however benign their economic
consequences.
The unbending focus on public-private transactions, rather than
their welfare implications, means that the book skirts the real source
of both rent-seeking and rent-extracting corruption: the size and
power of government. Whether the . corruption complained of is pay
ment for special favors (bad corruption) or corruption to avoid impo
sition of even greater costs (good corruption), the corruption problem
29. The attitude toward taxes in Corruption and Government is quite ambivalent. In
places it is recognized that taxes are imposed for inappropriate reasons or are inappropri
ately onerous, pp. 51-52, yet payments to avoid inappropriate or overly burdensome taxes
are also decried, pp. 16-17.
30. E.g. , JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH
(1987); see Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Con
gress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987) (reviewing BIRNBAUM
& MURRAY, supra).
31. David Maraniss, PAC Heaven: Commerce
WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1983, at Al.

Contributions,

Committee Members Roll Up Corporate
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is defined by the government, problem. 6ov�rnments that have the
size and power to award special favors1 and impose special costs are
governments that, by definition, will cause the greatest amount of cor
ruption. As one economist writes, "[c]orruption is a direct conse
quence of discretionary authority by government officials."32
Typically, then, an economist evaluates corruption relative to gov
ernmental action. Corruption, like practically everything else in life
(including government), has costs and benefits. Those costs and bene
fits are the flip side of the government policy causing it. Some gov
ernment power may be good, some is bad. So, corruption can be bad
or good, depending on the nature of the cause. When government is
wrong, working around its errors must be good. When government is
right, circumventing its edicts is bad. Concerning government regula
tion, a frequent subject in Corruption and Government, economist
Steven Cheung summarizes the view "apparently shared by most
economists":
[C]orruption generally is good, though sometimes not so good. It is good
because most regulations and controls move the market away from Pa
reto optimality. Corruption will then cause a move back toward the Pa
reto condition. Some regulations, however, are good because they move
the economy closer to Pareto optimality. Given good regulations, corrup
tion moves the market away from efficiency. Therefore, some corruption
is good, and some is bad. With bad regulations, corruption is good. With
good regulations, corruption is bad.33

But in Corruption and Government, all corruption is bad precisely
because it circumvents government. Professor Rose-Ackerman's devo
tion to incumbent government sometimes seems unquestioning.
Whatever the government does defines the public interest. In her con
clusion, she writes:
Self-interest and the public interest frequently conflict. In a corrupt
relationship both the briber and the recipient are better off, but the
transaction violates government policy. A criterion other than willing
ness to pay is supposed to prevail. [p. 225]

Automatic equation of "public interest" and "government policy" is
incorrect. The two are often diametrically opposed. This fact is par
ticularly true in the countries on which Professor Rose-Ackerman fo
cuses.34

32. Benson, supra note 8, at 74.
33. Cheung, supra note 8, at 1 .
34. There are passages i n the book i n which Professor Rose-Ackerman acknowledges
the existence of beneficial corruption, if only implicitly. "Citizen concerns over bribes paid in
return for favors indicate that people recognize norms of fair dealing and competent admini
stration and are beginning to demand that government serve general public purposes." P.
225. But an analysis of corruption and government cannot have it both ways. Either govern
ment is or is not serving the public interest, and if the latter, corruption may be beneficial.
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In making her, goal the suppression 1of all corruption, not just eco
nomically deleterious corruption, Professor Rose-Ackerman clearly
disagrees with economists who would approach the subject in standard
cost-benefit terms. She admits many analysts believe bribes "have de
sirable incentive properties."35 She dismisses such claims at the outset
(pp. 16-26), before getting to the details of Third-World corruption
that make up the bulk of the book. Her refutation consists of four ar
guments.
First, good corruption begets bad corruption. Even if some corrup
tion were good, permitting it "may encourage its spread to other areas
with harmful consequences" (p. 16). The reasoning is circular, since
she claims all corruption is bad to start with. No evidence is provided,
either, that allowing good corruption increases bad corruption. Why
wouldn't good corruption breed even more good corruption?
Second, the book continues, corruption occurs secretly, therefore
inefficiently; "if bribes do serve a valid resource allocation function,
they should be legalized, and the fees made public" (p. 26). But to say
corruption is bad because it is illegal and therefore must occur clan
destinely begs the questions: Why is the activity illegal in the first
place? Why should it be? The problem of secretiveness merely reflects
the state of the law. If the law is bad, then the corruption - however
clandestine - can be good.
Consider the example of bribes paid by Jews to get weapons into
and people out of the Warsaw Ghetto. It occurred secretly, of course,
because it was illegal and highly dangerous. Yet, surely, this is good
corruption. As Gary Becker and George Stigler write, "bribes that re
duced the effectiveness . . . of the laws in Nazi Germany against
Jews . . . would improve, not harm, social welfare (although not as de
fined by the legislature)."36
Just as surely, to return to Professor Rose-Ackerman's first argu
ment, successful attempts to buy one's way out of the Ghetto fostered
further attempts by others: good corruption provoked more of the
same. The Warsaw Ghetto is an extreme example, but the point is ap
plicable in many contexts. Abortions occurred illegally and therefore
secretly in the United States for most of our history. Were the pay
ments necessary to keep abortionists in business good or bad corrup
tion? That they were made secretly tells one nothing other than that
they were illegal.
The book's third and fourth reasons why corruption is always bad
focus on the effects produced on the briber and bribee. On the briber
side, "corruption can contribute to an uncertain business climate" (p.

35. P. 16. "Several authors have pointed out that some corruption might be desirable."
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 12, at 600.
36. Becker & Stigler, supra note 4, at 6.
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17). Bribers cannot be sure that what they-are ipaying for will be deliv
ered, and payments made firm by firm' "result in a wide variance in
conditions across firms" (p. 17). On the bribee side, corruption can
"hold back state reform" (p. 17), and it "undermines the legitimacy of
government" (p. 26).
These propositions confound the cause with the symptom. Corrup
tion in the Warsaw Ghetto indicated the lack of certainty Jews faced.
But the bribes hardly created the lack of certainty; they manifested it.
Likewise, the entire atrocity that was the Warsaw Ghetto could only
"undermine the legitimacy" of the Nazi government. Bribery in the
face of illegal abortion or banned drag shows illustrates the same
point. Bribes often solve a problem, not cause it.
The real problem is the size and power of government. The surest
way to reduce corruption is to reduce government. Professor Rose
Ackerman disagrees, briefly but emphatically: "[A] general program
to shrink the size of government will not necessarily reduce corrup
tion" (p. 41 ). The support for that position is a short (fourteen-page)
paper Professor Rose-Ackerman published in a Spanish-language
journal.37 The book disposes of the entire subject in fewer than two
pages. Given that this position is contrary to that of almost all econo
mists,38 Corruption and Government's cursory treatment of the issue is
disappointing.
The book's reasons why reducing government will not reduce corruption are confusing.
Recall that scarcity produces corrupt incentives, and notice that reduc
tions in government spending can produce scarcity when spending pro
grams are cut or when regulatory budgets fall with no change in the un
derlying statutes. Even worse, if a government under fiscal pressure cuts
back spending, it may at the same time seek to maintain its influence by
increasing regulations and mandates. The result can be increased corrup
tion. [p. 41]

But how is this a "general program to shrink the size of government"?
In her example, government reduces "regulatory budgets" but corrup37. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Una Administracion Reducida Significa
145 NUEVA SOCIEDAD 66 (1996).

una Administracion

Mas Limpia?,

38. This view is also contrary to many non-economists who focus on corruption. J.D.
Pope of Transparency International (TI), the international corruption-monitoring organiza
tion located in Berlin, notes that the sort of program Professor Rose-Ackerman advocates enforce the laws, or reform them and enforce them - hardly constitutes the full range of
possible or desirable solutions to corruption:
Countering corruption cannot be simply a matter of enacting laws, it is a matter of making
systems work. It involves changing the way people behave - and this can only be done by
altering the environment in which they are behaving. There are four broad scenarios when it
comes to tackling systematic corruption. This first is a good, old-fashioned revolution.
Jeremy D. Pope, Transparency International and the Drive Against Corruption, in
CORRUPTION, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 225, 231
(Ayodele Aderinwale ed., 1995).
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tion nevertheless ensues because government seeks "to maintain its
influence by increasing regulations and mandates." The same govern
ment that had the same regulatory powers before is "increasing gov
ernment regulations and mandates."
Some of the problem may ,be .a misunderstanding of how to meas
ure the size and power of government. Professor Rose-Ackerman
gives the following explanation why shrinking government can actu
ally increase corruption:
[A]n overall contraction in the size of the government budget may simply
make government benefits scarcer. Corruption may then increase a:s po
tential beneficiaries compete for the increasingly scarce pool of benefits.
Spending cuts accompanied by increases in regulations may simply shift
the locus of corruption. It is not enough for a country to get its macro
economic totals in line with IMF guidelines. Nations should be con
cerned with the underlying structure of public programs, not just the size
of government. [p. 42]

The book seemingly equates reducing the size and power of govern
ment with reducing government spending. But corruption has no nec
essary relation to government spending or government budgets.
Purely public corruption is official theft that occurs off the books. In
public-private corruption, payments made to public officials for special
favors (rent seeking) or to avoid government imposition of costs (rent
extraction) are likewise off the books.
A similar confusion pervades the book's attitude toward privatiza
tion. If the size and power of government are principal factors both in
purely public corruption and in public-private corruption, one obvious
solution would be privatizing functions that need not be performed by
government (and often are not, outside the Third World). Not so, the
book says (pp. 35-38). Privatization may be a sham, with the firm
owned by the kleptocrat's family (as in Suharto's Indonesia). A gov
ernment that is strong enough to steal from the fisc is strong enough to
force payments from private firms. But privatization that maintains re
sources in the kleptocrats' hands, or leaves him free to take from the
private firm the way he did from the treasury, is not what most people
mean by privatization. Government maintains economic control over
the resources concerned; its discretionary authority - the source of
corruption - is unchanged. True privatization goes unanalyzed.
Ill.

CORRUPTION, GOVERNMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS

Why does Corruption and Government almost categorically refuse
to consider reducing government as a solution to corruption? One rea
son may be the author's World Bank experience, which left such an
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impression.39 Almost all the book concerns corruption abroad, based
on a large library of studies produced by, for, or in conjunction with
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other inter
national organizations. For these organizations, providing financial
support to Third World governments, corruption is a touchy subject.
Professor Rose-Ackerman reports of her year at the World Bank:
It was fascinating to work on a topic - corruption - that the Bank had
treated with indirection in the past. I began to collect euphemisms. Peo
ple told me that when a review of a program mentioned "governance
problems," "unexpected cost overruns," or "excessive purchase of vehi
cles," this meant that corruption and simple theft were a problem. A
World Bank staffer pointed out that complaints about "excessive capital
labor ratios" in a report on Indonesia meant that corruption was not only
rife but costly. [pp. xi-xii]

The book says little about why corruption is so ticklish a subject that
circumlocution is required. But it is not hard to understand why. In
ternational agencies actually increase the amount of international cor
ruption.
Recall that illegal corruption is a function of the gains available
from crime. International agencies exist to funnel bags of money to
foreign governments.
From the [World Bank's] creation in 1946 until the late 1960s, it was a
conservative institution . . . . Then, in 1968, Robert McNamara became
bank president and dedicated himself to continually raising loan levels.
By 1981, when McNamara resigned, lending had increased more than 13. fold, from $883 million to $12 billion. Loan levels have continued soar
ing . . . . According to the bank's own auditors, bank projects have suf
fered from "unseemly pressure" to lend more money.40 .

These numbers are perhaps small potatoes by Western standards.
They are often astronomical, however, relative to overall economic ac
tivity in the recipient nation.41 If corruption is a positive function of the
amounts of money available to corrupt, then international agencies
are responsible for an increase in corruption.
Moreover, international bureaucrats are like any others: what ex
pands their budgets is good for them.42 To keep the money coming
39.

See supra text

accompanying note 3.

40. James Bovard, The World Bank and the Impoverishment of Nations, in
PERPETUATING POVERTY 59 (Doug Bandow & Ian Vasquez eds., 1994) (citing WORLD
BANK, TwELFTH ANNUAL REVIEW OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE RESULTS 48 (1987)) .
4 1 . E.g. , Doug Bandow, Foreign Aid Doesn't Work, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, May 14, 1997,
at 6 ("In some years, assistance accounted for as much as 30% o(the GDP of the recipient
state. Over the entire period, aid was 10% of Haiti's GDP, 15 % of Burundi's and Rwanda's,
and nearly 20% of Chad's.") ..
42. The classic citation is WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND BUDGETS
(1971). For the wealth of work done thereafter, see DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II
250-57 (1989).
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from donor nations/international organizations need the donee states
to accept the money offeted.43 International agencies therefore have
generally deferred to foreign governments (meaning, often, dictators)
in the projects that they underwrite. The IMF "remains politically de
pendent on the very government's to whom it lends."44 Says one World
Bank official from Ghana:· "We do not have Bank projects in Africa.
Rather, we work with the governments to do what they believe is best
for their development aspirations."45
With so much money and a desire to work with national govern
ments, international-agency involvement in underdeveloped econo
mies has often resulted in economic disaster. This has been due, in
particular, to agency preferences for lending to corrupt socialistic
economies.46
In nations like Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire, foreign assistance
subsidized autocratic and corrupt dictators who consciously wrecked
their nations. This has made reform even more difficult. Argues Alex De
Waal, one-time vice director of Africa Watch: Aid "is structurally bad
because all forms of relief undermine the incentive to take responsibility.
The more aid a country receives, the less the government of that country
has to answer to the people." . . . Michael Maren, who has worked for the
Peace Corps, Catholic Relief Services and U.S. AID, says that the food
program there "was working to prop up a corrupt dictator and turn no
mads into relief j unkies."47

43. Roland Vaubel, The Political Economy of the IMF: A Public Choice Analysis, in
PERPETUATING POVERTY, supra note 40 at 55 ("All this is not to deny that many dedicated
civil servants work at the IMF. But they are exposed to a perverse bureaucratic incen�
tive . . . . (E]xpanding their institution is where their interests meet." (citation omitted)).
44.

Id.

at 47.

45. W. Paatii Ofosu-Amaah, Colloquy, The Role of Multi-Lateral Institutions in African
30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 697, 698 (1999) (remarks of W. Paatii Ofosu
Amaah, Chief Counsel, Africa Division, World Bank Legal Department); see also Michael
M. Phillips, IMF Makes a Push for Good Government, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1999, at A2
("(I]t will be difficult for the World Bank and IMF to fully implement the new [anti
corruption] policy, partly because they are owned by the very governments whose integrity
and effectiveness are in questions.").
Development,

46. "Almost everyone in the policy community today acknowledges that market
friendly economic policies are critical for growth. Aid officials have often not disagreed, but
have tried arguing that aid money can induce countries to move to market. Foreign transfers
more often subsidize economic failure, however - witness Russia." Doug Bandow, Aid
Prolongs Third World Poverty, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Aug. 20, 1999, at 6; see also Hugh
Pope, Corruption Stunts Growth in Ex-Soviet States, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2000, at A17.
47. Id; see Michael Maren, THE ROAD TO HELL: THE RAVAGING EFFECTS OF FOREIGN
AID AND INTERNATIONAL CHARITY (1997). Maren's firsthand account is as searing as its
title indicates. See also Michael Maren, Manna From Heaven? Somalia Pays the Price for
Years of Aid, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 19, 1993, at 23; Alex de Waal & Rakiya Omaar, Doing
Harm by Doing Good? The International Relief Effort in Somalia, CURRENT HISTORY, May
1993, at 198 (authored by the co-directors of African Rights, a human rights group in
London).
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Perennially, the agencies promise they will irr.iprove. -But economists
Alberto Alesian and Beatrice Weder report in a study for the National
Bureau for Economic Research that "more corrupt governments still
tend to receive more aid."48
International agencies' tendency to corrupt is seen in their contin
ued preferences for the Big Project in borrower (donee) nations.49
Purely as a way toward economic development, big projects (dams,
roads, ports) are suspect.50 Efficient development starts with private
entrepreneurship; therefore donors can do more good by getting the
national government off local entrepreneurs' backs.51 The Big Project
puts money into the hands of national . authorities, increasing their
power and so converting "aid" into a development obstacle.52
If so, why does self-defeating aid in the form of Big Projects con
tinue? Because politicians, even in developed nations without interna48. Bandow, supra note 46; see also George B.N. Ayittey, How the Multilateral Institu
tions Compounded Africa's Economic Crisis, 30 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 585 (1999).
49. In discussing "projects normally financed through bank credits or, in the case of ex
ternal aid, through concessional credits," a former dii-ector-general of development at the
European Commission writes:
The disastrous effect of corruption reaches its highest point when the conception and even
tually the choice of a project are determined by corruption. By conception, I mean the ac
quisition of inappropriate technology to the needs of the country or the choice of project
lays more emphasis on capital, often more rewarding in corrupt terms than that based on
manpower which would be more useful for development . . . . I would like to quote Remi
Godeau in Jeune Afrique of July 94: "Africa is larded with abandoned motor-ways eaten
away by the savannah, factories down the drain hardly some few years upon taking off, im
passable rail lines due to lack of maintenance, hydro-electric dams abandoned due to lack of
profitability.
Dieter Frisch, Effects of Corruption on Development, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN WEST AFRICA 59 (1994).

CORRUPTION, DEMOCRACY AND

50. Michael M. Phillips, Hippocratic Oath: Can World Bank Lend Money to Third
World Without Hurting Poor?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2000, at A l :
World Bank officials took a Hippocratic oath when they agreed i n 1997 t o lend India more
than a half-billion dollars to mine coal. Above all, the bank officials swore to themselves, the
project would do no harm. . . . World Bank officials concede that, once again, one of their
massive Third World investments has exacted a severe toll on citizens whose lives ultimately
were supposed to have been made better. . . Still, bank officials continue to see the big proj
ects as necessary for nurturing fragile economies. "These are the bread and butter of the
bank historically," and it doesn't intend to back away from them, says Mr. Lim [World Bank
director for India].
5 1 . HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE
THIRD WORLD (1989); Cheung, supra note 8. Ayittey, supra note 48, at 588, writes:
[A] distinction should always be made between African leaders and people. For example, the
expression "the U.S. is helping Africans develop their economies" is very misleading. Whom
does the U.S. help - African leaders or people? The two are not necessarily synonymous,
but there often exists an erroneous presumption that helping African leaders necessarily
helps the people. The leadership has been the problem, not the people. Despite this, the
West. continues to invest heavily in African leaders.
52. Professor Rose-Ackerman understands this. Early in the book she warns against
corruption's encouragement of "excessive public infrastructure investment" (p. 3), and
closes by warning against "state sponsorship of massive infrastructure projects that are too
large and complex" (p. 228).
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tional aid, prefer tli'e Big Project. Politicians find it useful to bestow
large rewards on their deserving (i.e., rent seeking) constituents. Big
Projects do a better job of pinpointing the deserving constituents. In
the United States, for example, the Army Corps of Engineers is the
king of Big Project agencies, and receives unrivaled political backing.53
Even agencies like the U.S. Forest Service find that building roads, not
forests, is the way to go.54
More important, the Big Project also facilitates corruption. Profes
sor Rose-Ackerman herself agrees that "[c]orrupt payments to win
major contracts and concessions are generally the preserve of large
businesses and high-level officials" (p. 27). So, why not reduce corrup
tion by ending the emphasis on Big Projects and decentralizing foreign
aid? Alas, national governments, the "high-level officials," and klepto
crats to whom Professor Rose-Ackerman refers, do not want little
projects. Without national government agreement on what interna
tional agencies give, the agencies have no projects at all.
Personally, Professor Rose-Ackerman probably would agree with
this assessment. But Corruption and Government is hardly more eager
to confront the systemic deficiencies directly than those World Bank
employees whose euphemisms she reports. Chapter Ten covers "The
Role of the International Community" in reducing corruption. She
says that in the World Bank, "[c]orruption is no longer a taboo sub
ject" (p. 196). But to her, it is not something that international agen
cies cause, either. Corruption is something that happens to the World
Bank and its money, not something that its money might actually be
responsible for. Agencies are victims, too.
A serious attempt to deal with the subject will require confrontations
with many borrowers and with lenders whose own firms pay bribes in de
veloping countries. The World Bank's own difficulties are easy to see in
their policy document Helping Countries Combat Corruption . . . . Yet

53. E.g. , Michael Grunwald, Working to Please Hill Commanders,

WASH. POST, Sept.

1 1 , 2000, at Al:
What does the Army Corps of Engineers do in Mississippi? Generally, whatever Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott and Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman Thad Cochran
want it to do . . . . Lott and Cochran have directed the Corps to supply water to major indus
tries in Lott's home town of Pascagoula and to raise the Mississippi River levees. They are
pushing the Corps to dredge harbors in Pascagoula and Gulfport and a marina at a northern
Mississippi lake resort. They moved the local Corps district to a sprawling campus that one
agency memo called the TajMaVicksburg.
54.

BILL BRYSON,

A

WALK IN THE WOODS 46-47 (1998):

The Forest Service is truly an extraordinary institution. A lot of people, seeing that word
forest in the title, assume it has something to do with looking after trees. In fact, no though that was the original plan . . . . In fa ct, mostly what the Forest Services does is build
roads. I am not kidding. There are 378,000 miles of roads in America's national forests. That
may seem a meaningless figure, but look at it this way - it is eight times the total mileage of
America's interstate highway system. It is the largest road system in the world in the control
of a single body. . . . It is the avowed aim of the U.S. Forest Service to construct 580,000
miles of additional forest road by the middle of the next century.
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change cannot occur unless countries acknowledge the problem and deal
with it . . . . [p. 197; citation omitted]

In football, the best defense is a good offense. International agen
cies now work hard to create an image of themselves as corruption
busters.55 The book toes this line.
The previous chapters outlined the steps that a reform-minded gov
ernment can take to reduce corruption. International aid and lending
agencies should start with such a framework and work with individual
countries to develop a realistic program . . . . Existing attempts include
the provision of resources and technical assistance to ease the transition
to a competent, less numerous, and well-paid civil service system. The
success of such efforts has been mixed and not always very durable, but
the effort needs to be continued - especially if the World Bank can
learn from some of its past failures.56

This slant played well during the recent public-relations difficulties
experienced by these agencies.57 But it comes off as remarkably similar
to Budweiser's public-relations campaign exhorting responsible
drinking - the similarity not diminished by episodes of alleged cor
ruption within the World Bank itself,58 and in other aid-related pro
grams.59
55. Bandow, Foreign Aid Doesn't Work, supra note 41: "Rather than dismantle failed
programs, however, government agencies and multilateral organizations have been con
cocting new justifications for more of the same." Sometimes, though, busting corruption
simply means stanching the flow of international money to corrupt countries, a tacit admis
sion that the corruption was linked to the money in the first place. See Phillips, IMF Makes a
Push for Good Government, supra note 45.
56. Pp. 183-84 (citation omitted). For another example of the perspective that corrup
tion just happens and then creates problems for international financial agencies, see Nancy
Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption: Are International Institutions Doing Their Job?, 90
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 98 (1996).
57. Last April, when several different organizations demonstrated and rioted against the
World Bank and IMF in Washington, USA Today editorialized in favor of these organiza
tions.
In the past several years, these institutions have been reforming themselves. The IMF is be
coming less secretive in its practices, and auditing its loans better so borrowers can't
steal. . . .

And both institutions are on the right path in using their clout to help root out corruption
in the countries to which they provide loans.

Editorial, Protesters
at 14A.

2000

Target Institutions Most Able to Help the Poor,

USA TODAY, Apr. 14,

,

58. William Murray, World Bank Investigating Possible Embezzlement, WALL ST. J.,
July 17, 1998, at A12 (reporting that the World Bank "has found evidence of possible kick
backs and embezzlement at the international antipoverty institution" and that, in 1996, "the
Bank prosecuted [an] employee . . . for stealing about $500,000 by falsifying travel ac
counts").
59. E.g. , Pamela Ferdinand, U. S. Sues Harvard over Russia Aid Project, WASH . POST,
Sept. 27, 2000 at A21 (reporting that the United States was seeking $120 million in damages
in a suit against Harvard University alleging fraud by Harvard employees in contracts
Harvard had with U.S. Agency for International Development concerning development
,
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An agency that provides the .booty to foreign governments - some
of them those same kleptocrats that Professor Rose-Ackerman wrote
about a hundred pages earlier - cannot pretend that corruption
strikes like lightning thereafter. (Imagine Budweiser's announcing a
new campaign to give away free beer to people promising to drink re
sponsibly.) As both politic'al parties in the recent debate over welfare
reform in America have acknowledged, more welfare money leads to
more welfare abuse; one sure way to cut welfare abuse is to cut the
amount of welfare available.
Both economically and legally, actors are deemed to intend the
foreseeable consequences of their acts. When the World Bank
(Agency for International Development, United Nations, whatever)
ships in the bullion, it knows that at least part of what it will get is cor
ruption. The past is often the best indication.60 In 1999, "U.S. Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin acknowledged in congressional testimony that
much of the $4.8 billion that the IMF provided Russia last year 'may
have been siphoned off improperly.' "61
Corruption and Government is right to decry all of this. But antipa
thy is not analysis. As a self-described work of economics, the book
must confront the unfortunate fact that government power makes pos
sible corruption, and that international bodies working through na
tional government powers provoke more corruption. The real ques
tion is whether international agencies that, willy-nilly, foster
corruption among whatever else they achieve have other benefits ex
ceeding their costs.62 Many analysts, surveying international bodies'
subsidization of corruption and dictatorial socialism, would answer no,
including some analysts at the agencies themselves.63 But that issue,
obviously important, goes beyond Professor Rose-Ackerman's book.

projects in Russia); see also Editorial,
18.

Harvard on the Volga,

WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2000, at

60. Bandow, supra note 41 ("(T]he U.S. Agency for International Development . . . ad
mitted that 'much of the investment financed by (the U.S.] and other donors between 1960
and 1980 has disappeared without a trace.' " (quoting USAID report)).
61. Phillips, supra note 45.
62. If one last analogy is permitted, consider laws against drugs (or, formerly, alcohol).
No one likes debilitating addiction any more than one likes welfare-decreasing corruption.
But reducing addiction by outlawing drugs increases the number of murders. The positive
correlation between prohibition (of drugs or alcohol) and murder does not mean that people
could not conclude that prohibition is nonetheless worth all the murders. But it would be
unreasonable to pretend that more prohibition does not degenerate into more murder, and
thus to evaluate prohibition benefits without including the associated murder costs.
63. E.g., MAREN, supra note 47; Bandow, supra note 41 ("All too often, [recipients]
were aid-backed regimes that were not only corrupt but collectivist."); Joseph Kahn, World
Bank Cites Itself in Study of Africa's Bleak Performance, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2000, at A9
(referring to joint World Bank report with the United Nations and African development
institutions).
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·
I

In critiquing and sometimes criticizing a book like Corruption and
Government, one risks being misunderstood. Nothing in this Review
should suggest that legal reform to • stem malign corruption is rear
ranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Things like reforming procure
ment laws or increasing bureaucrats' salaries may well have benefits
exceeding their costs.64 To the extent that such solutions would reduce
bad corruption, they should be, and are, applauded.
But if one sincerely wants to reduce bad corruption - and no one
can doubt Professor Rose-Ackerman's dedication to eradicating cor
ruption - other fundamental points are missing or underemphasized
in this book.
First, there is that iceberg, government. Corruption and Govern
ment overplays corruption's manifestations and underplays govern
ment's role. Government is the real cause of corruption, and a book
on corruption cannot treat the subject without a model that includes
its size and power. A book about corruption written from an economic
perspective must recognize that, while all corruption is by definition
illegal, that does not make it bad economically.
Finally, the role of international agencies in all this analysis needs
more attention. Far from being mere victims of corruption, agencies
are frequently to blame for it. They keep giving kleptocrats money.
And therein lies much of the tale.

64. For some reports that reforms may be having the desired effects, see Phillips, supra
note 45 ("More than two dozen countries, from Russia to Paraguary, have asked for the
bank's help in combating corruption. It's become 'politically correct to request assistance,'
says Daniel Kaufmann, who works on the bank's anticorruption outreach. 'The question is
how to ascertain seriousness,' he says.").

